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Abstract
We describe and evaluate Zero-Effort Bilateral Recurring Authentication (ZEBRA) in our paper that appears in
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2014. In this report we provide a more detailed comparative evaluation
of ZEBRA against other related authentication schemes. The abstract of the paper follows.
Common authentication methods based on passwords, tokens, or fingerprints perform one-time authentication and
rely on users to log out from the computer terminal when they leave. Users often do not log out, however, which is a
security risk. The most common solution, inactivity timeouts, inevitably fail security (too long a timeout) or usability
(too short a timeout) goals. One solution is to authenticate users continuously while they are using the terminal and
automatically log them out when they leave. Several solutions are based on user proximity, but these are not sufficient:
they only confirm whether the user is nearby but not whether the user is actually using the terminal. Proposed solutions
based on behavioral biometric authentication (e.g., keystroke dynamics) may not be reliable, as a recent study suggests.
To address this problem we propose ZEBRA. In ZEBRA, a user wears a bracelet (with a built-in accelerometer,
gyroscope, and radio) on her dominant wrist. When the user interacts with a computer terminal, the bracelet records
the wrist movement, processes it, and sends it to the terminal. The terminal compares the wrist movement with the
inputs it receives from the user (via keyboard and mouse), and confirms the continued presence of the user only if
they correlate. Because the bracelet is on the same hand that provides inputs to the terminal, the accelerometer and
gyroscope data and input events received by the terminal should correlate because their source is the same – the user’s
hand movement. In our experiments ZEBRA performed continuous authentication with 85% accuracy in verifying
the correct user and identified all adversaries within 11 s. For a different threshold that trades security for usability,
ZEBRA correctly verified 90% of users and identified all adversaries within 50 s.
ZEBRA [10] is a token-based authentication scheme that authenticates users based on their interactions with the
device. Unlike keystroke-based biometrics that authenticates users based how they type, ZEBRA authenticates users
based on what interactions (e.g., typing, scrolling) they perform on the device and when. In ZEBRA users wear
a wrist-bracelet (token) that has built-in accelerometer and gyroscope sensors and a short range wireless radio to
communicate with the device. ZEBRA authenticates users by monitoring their hand movements, using the senors in the
wrist-bracelet, when they are interacting with the device, and comparing the hand movements with the inputs received
by the device during the interaction.
In ZEBRA the bracelet contains the identification information for its associated user, which it shares with the device
to authenticate the user. The user can associate the bracelet with herself when she wears the bracelet, say by entering a
PIN on the bracelet or through a secure channel to the bracelet. The bracelet clasp can detect when it is being taken off
and it de-associates with the user when it is taken off.
This is a companion technical report for a paper to appear in the Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2014.
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1 Comparison Framework
We compare ZEBRA with other related authentication schemes using the usability-deployability-security (UDS)
evaluation framework [5]. The UDS framework defines a set of benefits to evaluate web authentication schemes, but
many of those benefits are relevant to device authentication schemes. Table 1 summarizes our evaluation of ZEBRA
and 7 other authentication schemes. We first define all the benefits and then present our comparative evaluation of
ZEBRA and other related authentication schemes.
1.1 Benefits
The UDS framework defines total 25 benefits to evaluate web authentication schemes: 8 usability benefits, 6 deploya-
bility benefits, and 11 security benefits. We use total 15 benefits to evaluate ZEBRA and other related schemes: 12
benefits from the UDS framework and 3 additional benefits that are applicable to continuous authentication schemes.
As in the UDS framework, we rate each scheme as either offering or not offering the benefit of a property; if a
scheme almost offers the benefit, but not quite, we indicate this with the Quasi- prefix.
1.1.1 Usability benefits
Benefits U1-U3 are from the UDS framework, so we briefly define them here; see Bonneau et al. [5] for details. Benefit
U4 is also from the UDS framework but we slightly modify its definition and we explain the difference here. We
introduce usability benefit U5 for continuous authentication schemes.
U1 Memorywise-Effortless: Users of the scheme do not have to remember any secrets at all.
U2 Nothing-to-Carry: Users do not need to carry an additional physical object to use the scheme. We grant a
Quasi-Nothing-to-Carry if the scheme can be implemented on an object that users carry or wear everywhere all
the time anyway, such as their mobile phone, wrist watch, wearable fitness devices.
U3 Easy-Recovery-from-Loss: A user can conveniently regain the ability to authenticate if the authentication
credentials are forgotten or the token is lost. We grant a scheme Quasi-Easy-Recovery-from-Loss benefit if
the user has to purchase a token but can reset the authentication credentials herself without having to involve
another party. A user’s authentication credential is the information that the user presents to the device to get
authenticated, e.g., username and password, fingerprint. In this report we use refer authentication credentials as
simply credentials, unless otherwise noted.
U4 Physically-Effortless: The authentication process does not require any physical user effort beyond what the user
performs while interacting with the device to get his/her task done on the device. In other words, the scheme
should be passive, i.e., it should not require any explicit input from the user, but the scheme can use the inputs the
user anyway provides to the device to get his/her task done. A keystroke-based scheme that authenticates users
based on their typing pattern is passive and considered to be physically effortless, but a voice-based scheme when
the user does not use voice as input to the device is considered as requiring physical effort.
This definition is slightly different (stricter) from the UDS framework definition, which considers physically-
effortlessness only for authentication and not continuous authentication, and hence in the UDS framework simple
actions such as pressing a button are considered as effortless actions, but for a continuous authentication these
actions do not remain physically effortless. We grant schemes Quasi-Physically-Effortless benefit if they require
the user to perform an action which is easy and effortless to perform once.
U5 No-Constraint-on-Using-the-Device: The scheme should not add any constraint on how the user should use
the device or interact with the device. We grant Quasi-No-Constraint-on-Using-the-Device benefit to schemes
that add constraints that are easy to follow but do not require any additional physical effort from the user. For
example, facial-recognition scheme requires the user to be in the camera’s field of vision, which can be easy, but
a voice-based scheme requires the user to provide audio input, which is easy but requires physical effort.
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1.1.2 Deployability benefits
The following two deployability benefits are from UDS framework.
D1 Accessible: Users who can use passwords are not prevented from using the scheme by disabilities or other
physical (not cognitive) conditions.
D2 Negligible-Cost-per-User: The total cost per user of the scheme, adding up the costs at the prover’s end (any
device/token required for the user to authenticate) and the cost at the verifier’s end (any hardware and/or software
required on the device to authenticate the user). Quasi-Negligible-Cost-per-User is awarded to the scheme if
the required cost on prover’s end can be masked with the devices users carry anyway and the verifying device
already contains the required hardware.
1.1.3 Security benefits
Security benefits S1-S6 are from the UDS framework. We introduce two additional security benefits, S7 and S8, for
continuous authentication schemes.
S1 Resilient-to-Physical-Observation: An attacker cannot impersonate a user after observing them authenticate one
or more times. Attacks include shoulder surfing, filming the keyboard or mouse use [14], recording keystroke
timings based on sensors near the keyboard [11], or thermal imaging the keypad [13].
S2 Resilient-to-Internal-Observation: An attacker cannot impersonate a user by intercepting the user’s inputs from
inside the user’s device (e.g., by keylogging malware) or eavesdropping on the cleartext communication between
the user’s token (prover) and the authenticating device (verifier).
S3 Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers: Nothing that a verifier could possibly leak can help an attacker imper-
sonate the user to another device.
S4 Resilient-to-Phishing: An attacker who simulates the authentication process, e.g., by spoofing the authentication
screen, cannot collect credentials that can later be used to impersonate the user on the actual device.
S5 Resilient-to-Theft: If the credentials are lost they cannot be used for authentication by another person who gains
possession of it. The lost credentials can be passwords written down by paper or hardware tokens. This benefit
penalizes single-factor schemes that do not offer any protection against theft.
This definition is slightly different than the UDS definition. In the UDS framework this benefit is considered
only for schemes in which physical objects are used for authentication; we consider theft of even non-physical
credentials such as passwords, which can be stolen when people write them down. As in the UDS framework, we
grant Quasi-Resilient-to-Theft if the scheme protects the credential with the modest strength of a PIN.
S6 Require-Consent: The user is authenticated only with the user’s consent or intent. The UDS benefit requires an
‘explicit’ consent, which can make a continuous authentication scheme unusable, so we remove the ‘explicit’
consent requirement and require the scheme to use a passive consent or intent that matches users’ mental model,
i.e., users should not be authenticated when they are not using the device.
We grant Quasi-Require-Consent benefit to schemes that are better than consent by proximity alone, i.e.,
authenticating a user if she is in radio proximity of the device, but do not require a user to interact with the device
to express intent to use the device. For example, facial-recognition based or voice-based authentication schemes
may wrongly assume the user’s intent to use a device if she is present in front of the device’s camera or speaking
near the device, even though she may not be using the device. Whereas a keystroke-based scheme authenticates a
user when she is typing (i.e., using) the device, so these schemes are labeled Require-Consent. While evaluating
this benefit we do not consider impersonation attacks by an adversary.
S7 Verify-Actual-User: The scheme can verify whether the user is actually using the device at any point in time.
This benefit penalizes schemes one-time authentication schemes, which do not verify the user after the user
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authenticates once. We grant Quasi-Verify-Actual-User benefit to schemes that do weak verifications, such as
verifying whether the user is in front of the device (face-based schemes) or whether the user is speaking to the
device (voice-based).
S8 Continuous-Authentication: The scheme should continuously authenticate the user while she uses the device.
2 Comparative Evaluation
Now we compare several candidates for continuous authentication, using the above framework.
Table 1: Comparative evaluation of ZEBRA against other authentication schemes.
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ZEBRA [10]
Passwords
Proximity-based [7, 8, 17]
Fingerprint-based [3, 16]
Voice-based [1]
Face-based [2]
keystroke-based [9]
Impedance-based [15]
= offers the benefit; = almost offers the benefit; no circle= does not offer the benefit.
= better than ZEBRA; = worse than ZEBRA; no pattern= equivalent to ZEBRA.
1Additional properties, not in UDS framework.
2.1 ZEBRA
ZEBRA is Memorywise-Effortless and Physically-Effortless as users do not have to memorize any secret or take any
explicit action to authenticate. ZEBRA provides Quasi-Nothing-to-Carry benefit as it can be integrated with their
smart-watch or wrist fitness device It provides Quasi-Easy-Recovery-from-Loss as the user can easily replace her bracelet
by purchasing a new one. It is Accessible as users who can type can use this scheme and we rate it as Quasi-Negligible-
Cost-per-User because it can be integrated with existing fitness wrist-devices that users are increasingly wearing
everyday. ZEBRA provides Quasi-No-Constraint-on-Using-the-Device as it requires a user to use the bracelet hand
to provide inputs, but otherwise it adds no constraints on device usage. ZEBRA is Resilient-to-Physical-Observation,
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Resilient-to-Internal-Observation, Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers, and Resilient-to-Phishing as it does not use
any stored secret for authentication.
We grant ZEBRA Quasi-Resilient-to-Theft because it can be made resilient to theft either by using a special clasp
that deassociates the bracelet with the user when it is taken off and once deassociated the bracelet cannot be used to
authenticate as that user, or by using a biometric that identifies the bracelet wearer [6]. ZEBRA does Require-Consent
as it authenticates only when a user is providing inputs to the device, i.e., when the user is using the device. ZEBRA
does Verify-Actual-User as it verifies the user who is interacting with it, and it does Continuous-Authentication.
2.2 Passwords
Passwords clearly are not Memorywise-Effortless. They provide Nothing-to-Carry benefit, but they are not Physically-
Effortless as passwords need to be typed, but they do provide Easy-Recovery-from-Loss as they can be easily reset.
They are Accessible because we defined this benefit with respect to them. They have Negligible-Cost-per-User and they
add No-Constraint-on-Using-the-Device once the user authenticates by entering the right password, because they are
one-time authentication schemes.
Passwords are not Resilient-to-Physical-Observation as they can be easily recovered by a video of keyboard
or by carefully observing the user type the password [4] or using a sensor near the keyboard [11]. They are not
Resilient-to-Internal-Observation as keylogging malware can easily capture the entered password. They are also not
Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers if the user uses the same password. They are not Resilient-to-Phishing or
Resilient-to-Theft as the attacker can use the obtained password to impersonate the user. They do Require-Consent
as the users have to enter their passwords to authenticate. Passwords do not Verify-Actual-User because the device
assumes the current user is the user who last authenticated and they do not provide Continuous-Authentication.
2.3 Proximity-based schemes
Proximity-based schemes authenticate users if they are in the proximity of the device as determined by the wireless
radio signal strength from a token they carry. These schemes are Memorywise-Effortless and Physically-Effortless,
and Quasi-Nothing-to-Carry as users have to carry the proximity tokens, but these tokens can be integrated with their
smartphones. They are not as easy to recover as passwords but they can be recovered by buying another token, so we
grant them Quasi-Easy-Recovery-from-Loss. They are Accessible and better than ZEBRA because it works even for
users who are passively using a device (i.e., not typing) or users who are not typing with the bracelet hand (e.g., one
hand typing). The wireless token can be integrated with any electronic jewelry the user wears or the user’s phone so we
grant Quasi-Negligible-Cost-per-User, and these schemes add No-Constraint-on-Using-the-Device.
These schemes are Resilient-to-Physical-Observation, Resilient-to-Internal-Observation, Resilient-to-Leaks-from-
Other-Verifiers, and Resilient-to-Phishing if we assume that the communication between the token and the device is
secure and cannot be eavesdropped by the attacker. These schemes can be somewhat resilient to theft by using a special
clasp that deassociates with the user when it is taken off, and once deassociated it cannot be used to authenticate as
that user. So we grant these schemes Quasi-Resilient-to-Theft because they can be made resilient to theft by ensuring
that they cannot be used to impersonate a user when they are not being worn by that user. These schemes do not
Require-Consent as the user is authenticated whenever she is in the proximity of the device, without any consent, and for
the same reason these schemes do not Verify-Actual-User. They do provide Continuous-Authentication, but they may
not authenticate the user who is actually using the device and we reflect this by not granting them the Verify-Actual-User
benefit.
2.4 Fingerprint-based schemes
Fingerprint-based schemes are Memorywise-Effortless and Nothing-to-Carry, as in any biometric scheme, but they
are not Physically-Effortless as the user has to swipe or hold the finger on the reader. They do not provide Easy-
Recovery-from-Loss as a fingerprint, once stolen, cannot be reset. We grant them Quasi-Accessible because they are not
effective against users who do not have fingerprints or if the user’s fingerprint changes due to external factors, such as an
injury. They do not provide Negligible-Cost-per-User because each device needs have a fingerprint scanner. They add
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No-Constraint-on-Using-the-Device because, like passwords, they are one-time authentication and once authenticate
they allow full access to the user until she logs out.
They are Resilient-to-Physical-Observation as they are hard to capture by video but they are not Resilient-to-Internal-
Observation, Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers, Resilient-to-Phishing, and Resilient-to-Theft. Users have to swipe
their finger to get authenticated so they do Require-Consent but they do not Verify-Actual-User because like passwords
they assume the current user is the same user who last authenticated, and they do not provide Continuous-Authentication.
2.5 Voice-based schemes
Voice-based authentication schemes are physiological biometric schemes that authenticate users based on their unique
voice patterns. Voice-based authentication can be used for initial authentication, as for passwords or fingerprints, with
many of the same properties as fingerprints. Voice-based methods can also be used for continuous authentication, which
is how we evaluate them here.
These schemes are also Memorywise-Effortless and Nothing-to-Carry but they are not Physically-Effortless as the
user has to speak out loud for authentication and they do not provide Easy-Recovery-from-Loss, like other biometrics.
We grant them Quasi-Accessible because some these schemes do not work for speech-impaired users or if the user’s
voice changes due to illness or injury. We consider them Quasi-Negligible-Cost-per-User because many devices today
have a built-in microphone and it is inexpensive to add one, if required. To perform continuous authentication with these
schemes users need to speak out loud frequently so they do not provide No-Constraint-on-Using-the-Device benefit.
They are not Resilient-to-Physical-Observation as an adversary can easily record a user’s voice with a microphone.
These schemes are also not Resilient-to-Internal-Observation, Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers and Resilient-
to-Phishing, and once the voice credentials are stolen an adversary can use them to impersonate the user so these
schemes are not Resilient-to-Theft. Users have speak out loud to authenticate, so we grant these schemes Quas-
Require-Consent. We grant these schemes Quasi-Verify-Actual-User because these schemes verify whether the user is
speaking near the device and not whether the user is actually using the device. These schemes can be used to perform
Continuous-Authentication.
2.6 Face-based schemes
Face-based schemes authenticate a user based on the device’s recognition of the image of her face as captured by the
device’s camera. Face-based authentication can be used for initial authentication, as for passwords or fingerprints, with
many of the same properties as passwords. Face-based methods can also be used for continuous authentication, which
is how we evaluate them here.
These schemes are Memorywise-Effortless and Nothing-to-Carry, like any biometric, and these schemes are also
Physically-Effortless as the user simply has to be in-front of the camera when using the device. These schemes, like voice
and fingerprint biometrics, do not provide Easy-Recovery-from-Loss. We grant them Quasi-Accessible because these
schemes may not perform with wearables (e.g., glasses), in poor lighting, or if the user’s face changes due to an injury.
These schemes provide Quasi-Negligible-Cost-per-User because many devices today have a built-in video camera
and it is inexpensive to buy a camera, if required. We grant these schemes Quasi-No-Constraint-on-Using-the-Device
because they require the user to be present in the camera’s field of view.
These schemes are not Resilient-to-Physical-Observation as an adversary can easily capture as image of the user’s
face with a camera. These schemes are also not Resilient-to-Internal-Observation, Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-
Verifiers and Resilient-to-Phishing, and Resilient-to-Theft. We grant these schemes Quasi-Require-Consent because
they require the user to be within the camera’s field of vision, which is a better indication of intent to use a device than
simply being in proximity of the device. These schemes do not Verify-Actual-User as the user who is camera’s field of
view may not be the one who is actually using the device, but they can provide Continuous-Authentication.
2.7 Keystroke-based schemes
Keystroke-based schemes authenticate users based on their typing behavior, which is measured using keystroke-
dynamics that includes properties such as the time between two keystrokes or the time for each keystroke. These
schemes are based on our behavior and hence are Memorywise-Effortless and Nothing-to-Carry. Although these
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schemes require typing, we grant them Physically-Effortless because these schemes can be designed to use the typing
inputs that the user provides to the device and do not require any explicit input from the user. These schemes, like some
other biometric schemes, do not provide Easy-Recovery-from-Loss and we grant them Quasi-Accessible because they
will not work if the user’s typing behavior changes due to the user’s mood, stress, different type of devices, or some
injury.
These schemes have Negligible-Cost-per-User as there is not additional hardware cost. There is the initial training
cost for each user, and maybe for each device, but we consider that cost negligible. Other than the constraint that users
should type, which users anyway do to interact with most devices, these schemes do not add any other constraint so
we grant them Quasi-No-Constraint-on-Using-the-Device and rate them better than ZEBRA because ZEBRA adds an
additional small constraint that the user has type with both hands or the bracelet hand, i.e., the user should use the
bracelet hand during typing. sub These schemes are not Resilient-to-Physical-Observation as the keystroke dynamics
can be recorded using a sensor near the keyboard [11]. They are also not Resilient-to-Internal-Observation, Resilient-
to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers and Resilient-to-Phishing. These schemes are not Resilient-to-Theft because, once the
keystroke dynamics of a user are stolen, an adversary can use them to impersonate the user [12]. As the user has to
type in order to be authenticated and typing indicates the intent to use a device, these schemes Require-Consent to
authenticate. These schemes Verify-Actual-User as they authenticate the user who is providing keyboard input to a
device, i.e., who is actually using the device, and hence they can provide Continuous-Authentication.
2.8 Impedance-based schemes
These schemes authenticate a user based on her body’s impedance response to small electric current passed through her
body [6, 15]. For continuous authentication on a device Rasmussen et al. [15] proposed instrumenting the keyboard
of the device and measure the body’s impedance response when an electric current is passed through one hand and
received through another when the user is typing.
Like other biometric scheme, these schemes are Memorywise-Effortless and Nothing-to-Carry. We consider these
schemes Physically-Effortless because these schemes can authenticate when the user is using the device (i.e., typing)
without requiring the user to provide any explicit input. These schemes do not provide Easy-Recovery-from-Loss. We
grant them Quasi-Accessible because human body’s impedance response can change due to external environmental
factors such as temperature or water intake of the user. As these schemes require instrumenting keyboards and the
required additional hardware is not inexpensive, these schemes require more than Negligible-Cost-per-User. These
schemes place an additional constraint that the user should use keep both hands in contact with the keyboard when
typing, so we grant them Quasi-No-Constraint-on-Using-the-Device and rate them worse than ZEBRA.
These schemes are Resilient-to-Physical-Observation but they are not Resilient-to-Internal-Observation and
Resilient-to-Phishing. They schemes can be made Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers by using a different frequency-
dependent response for each device so that a credential leaked from a device cannot be used to authenticate on another
device. Although an adversary can use the stolen credentials to impersonate the user on the device, these schemes can
prevent the adversary from using the credentials for one device on another, so we grant these schemes Quasi-Resilient-
to-Theft. As typing indicates intent to use a device, these schemes Require-Consent and they Verify-Actual-User and
can provide Continuous-Authentication.
3 Summary
In this report we present a framework to evaluate continuous authentication schemes and we do a comparative evaluation
of ZEBRA with 7 other authentication schemes. As per our evaluation (Table 1) ZEBRA is a secure, usable, and
deployable continuous authentication scheme: ZEBRA rates highest (with most solid circles) compared to the other 7
authentication schemes for the security properties that we considered; Password-based schemes are most deployable
compared to all schemes, but among continuous authentication schemes ZEBRA and Proximity-based schemes are
most deployable schemes; and in usability, ZEBRA is equally or more usable than other authentication schemes.
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